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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
is routine in tort law and the courts are more capable of performing this task
than ferreting out illusory psychological distinctions between intellectual
and physical gratification present in contractual objects. 5
Steve M. Marks
THE GAME'S AFOOT: THE STOREKEEPER'S HEIGHTENED RESPONSIBILITY FOR
SLIP AND FALL ACCIDENTS
Since World War Two, the American business community has under-
gone tremendous changes, especially in its retail merchandising system.
The small corner store has given way to national chain stores and self-
service shopping. The local grocery has turned into a giant supermarket. As
always, the law is running hard to keep stride with these changes, trying to
maintain an equilibrium between public policy and private interests. In
order to keep this balance of interests, our courts have had to redesign the
legal relationship between patrons and proprietors. This note examines
recent changes in Louisiana law affecting the responsibility of storekeepers
for slip and fall injuries sustained in their stores.
Louisiana storekeepers owe an affirmative duty to their patrons to use
ordinary or reasonable care' to provide safe aisles and passageways by
means of clean-up and inspection procedures consistent with the purposes of
the store. 2 While this language has been used consistently by the courts to
delay; whereas a breach of the obligation properly to repair the auto is less a
Iproximate" cause of inconvenience where the breach is unintentional. In the instant
case the court noted at the outset that the damages sought were suffered and that the
amount awarded was reasonable, thereby acknowledging the strong tie between the
obligation to repair within a reasonable time and the inconvenience suffered because
of its breach. See the text at note 14, supra.
45. See Ward v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 539 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1976)
(certified question to Louisiana Supreme Court concerning the application of the
principle of the instant case to the breach of a contract of insurance).
I. E.g., Calamari v. Winn Dixie La., Inc., 300 So. 2d 653 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1974); Broussard v. National Food Stores, Inc., 233 So. 2d 599 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1970), aff'd 258 La. 493, 246 So. 2d 838 (1971); Lofton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 208 So.
2d 739 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
2. E.g., Tripkovich v. Winn Dixie La., Inc., 284 So. 2d 80 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1973), aff'd 286 So. 2d 663 (1973); Fontanille v. Winn Dixie La., Inc., 260 So. 2d 71




describe a proprietor's duty, the actual scope of that duty received two
markedly different interpretations in the courts of appeal.
In Lofton v. Travelers Insurance Company ,' the Third Circuit applied
a standard that required the plaintiff to establish that the proprietor or one of
his employees created or maintained the dangerous condition which caused
the injury, or that the storekeeper or employee had actual or constructive
knowledge of that condition.' Because the plaintiff usually could not
ascertain how long the dangerous condition existed before it caused his
injury, he had difficulty proving actual or constructive knowledge on the
part of the storekeeper. In making recovery so difficult, the court limited the
storekeeper's duty, essentially placing most of the risk of self-service
shopping on the plaintiff. 5
The approach of Lofton was in sharp contrast with that taken in Lang v.
Winn Dixie Louisiana, Inc. ,6 in which the First Circuit broadly interpreted
the duty of care a proprietor owes to his patrons. In Lang, under a concept of
expanded duty, the storekeeper was held to a standard of care such that the
occurrence of the accident gave rise to an inference of negligence. To
establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff needed only to show that a
hazardous condition existed and that it caused his injury. The defendant then
had the burden of exculpation. 7 In order to meet that burden, the proprietor
had to prove that adequate inspection and clean-up procedures were carried
out. 8 Lang tended to shift the risk of self-service shopping from the shopper
to the proprietor. 9
3. 208 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 252 La. 457, 211 So. 2d 327
(1968).
4. Id. at 741.
5. Later cases relying on the Lofton rationale help illustrate how little was
required for the storekeeper to prevail in a slip and fall case. For example, in
Frederick v. Winn Dixie La., Inc., 227 So. 2d 387 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), plaintiff
slipped and fell on a grape at a check-out counter that had not been mopped for one
hour preceding the accident. The defendant received a favorable judgment because
the plaintiff failed to prove how long the grape had been on the floor. The court did
not even consider whether failure to keep check-out counters swept was a violation
of the proprietor's duty. In Orgeron v. Home Town Supermarket, 311 So. 2d 494 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1975), the plaintiff was injured when he slipped on sugar on the aisle
floor below the rack where sugar was on display. Although an employee had placed
sugar out on the shelves within one hour of the accident and admitted that sugar was
often on the floor, the court found that there had not been a violation of the
proprietor's duty.
6. 230 So. 2d 383 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
7. Id. at 388.
8. Id.
9. The standard of care under Lang was determined by the nature of the
premises, the purpose of the business, and the particular fact situation. Id. at 389. For
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The Louisiana Supreme Court confronted the issue of the scope of a
proprietor's duty in Kavlich v. Kramer'
° and Gonzales v. Winn Dixie. II
Analyzing the storekeeper's duty in terms of "reasonable care," the court
accepted the reasoning of Lang as controlling.' 2 Once the plaintiff estab-
lishes a prima facie case, the burden then "shifts"' 3 to the defendant to go
forward with the evidence to exculpate himself from the presumption that he
was negligent. 14
The duty of the'proprietor to protect his patrons from foreign sub-
stances on the floor is still one of reasonable care. Factors determinative of a
breach of that duty include the type and volume of merchandise, the type of
display, the floor space used for customer service, the nature of customer
service and the volume of business. 5 According to the new jurisprudence,
example, in Phillips v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 256 So. 2d 652 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972),
plaintiff slipped on a piece of fatty meat on the floor by the meat counter. There had
been an inspection of that area forty-five minutes before the accident. The court
found that this inspection met the standard of reasonable care required of the
proprietor and denied recovery to the plaintiff. In Welch v. Great A. & P. Tea Co.,
273 So. 2d 876 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1973), plaintiff slipped on a grape. The proprietor
had swept the floor within an hour of the accident and had made an inspection just
fifteen minutes before the accident. The court found that the storekeeper had not
violated his duty of care.
10. 315 So. 2d 282 (La. 1975).
11. 326 So. 2d 486 (La. 1976).
12. 326 So. 2d at 488; 315 So. 2d at 285. The court in Kavlich could have found
the storekeeper negligent for simply failing to see what was in front of his eyes;
instead it relied upon Lang. 315 So. 2d at 285.
13. The term "burden of proof" must be understood to encompass two distinct
concepts: the risk of non-persuasion and the duty of going forward with the evidence.
The risk of non-persuasion falls on the party whose case will fail if after all the
evidence has been presented the judge remains in doubt as to the culpability of the
other party. In other words, one party always bears the duty of persuading the judge
beyond the doubting point. The duty of going forward with the evidence means that a
party must produce a certain quantum of evidence before the judge will let a case go
to the jury. 9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT THE
COMMON LAW 270-72, 278-84 (3d ed. 1940). In Louisiana, where jury trials in civil
cases are rare and a judge is usually the entire tribunal before which a case is decided,
the duty of coming forward with the evidence loses some of its meaning. However, in
a slip and fall situation it is still the plaintiff who must convince the judge that the
storekeeper was negligent (the risk of non-persuasion). Since the decision in Kavlich,
a slip and fall accident gives rise to an inference of negligence because of the
storekeeper's expanded duty. The plaintiff, merely by showing that he slipped and
was injured due to a dangerous condition has come forward with enough evidence to
establish a prima facie case. At this point the duty of going forward with the evidence
shifts to the storekeeper to rebut the plaintiff's case.
14. 326 So. 2d 486, 488 (La. 1976); 315 So. 2d 282, 285 (La. 1975).
15. 326 So. 2d 486, 488 (La. 1976).
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the nature of the self-service grocery system heightens the duty to minimize
the risk of slip-and-fall accidents by frequent inspections and clean-ups. 16
Apparently the court considers the self-service systems dangerous; and
although the danger is not prohibitive, it is sufficient to justify placing a very
demanding duty of care upon the storeowner. Correspondingly, the stand-
ard of care is so high that the occurrence of the accident forces the proprietor
to exculpate himself. The question that logically follows is whether it is
possible at all for the storekeeper to exculpate himself.
In cases decided under the concept of limited duty, 7 the presence of a
foreign substance on the floor for thirty minutes was considered long
enough to create constructive knowledge in the storekeeper.' 8 Recent
Florida cases accepting the expanded duty concept have found negligent a
failure to inspect the aisles for just ten minutes.' 9 The frequency of aisle
inspections, shelf inspections and general store maintenance that will be
demanded of a Louisiana storekeeper has yet to be determined. The holding
in Gonzales at least indicates that because of his high duty of care, the
storekeeper will find it difficult to rebut the inference of negligence that
arises from an accident in his store.
20
Proof by inference is the essential element in the logic of the new slip
and fall cases. Consequently, it is unfortunate that the court does not take a
more direct approach in its analysis. Presented squarely with the opportuni-
ty to determine the applicability of res ipsa loquitur in slip and fall
situations, the supreme court has been totally ambiguous on this point in its
decisions."'
The supreme court's ambivalence on the use of res ipsa loquitur
probably stems from its desire to avoid the misunderstandings so commonly
connected with the term. Yet res ipsa loquitur is no more than a form of
proof by inference. 2 In Larkin v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
16. Id..
17. See text at note 3, supra.
18. E.g., Vogts v. Schwegman Bros. Giant Supermarkets, 56 So. 2d 177 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1952).
19. Miller's Thriftway Stores, Inc. v. Hohnsbeen, 240 So. 2d 84 (Fla. App. 1st
Dist. 1970); Jenkins v. Brackin, 171 So. 2d 589 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 1965).
20. Gonzales makes no reference to the required frequency of store inspections.
However, the case places on storekeepers an increased duty to minimize risks
through frequent inspection. Following Gonzales, inspections every fifteen minutes
have been deemed inadequate. Baptiste v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarket,
338 So. 2d 1163, 1167 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976) (Schott, J., concurring).
21. "Neither do we hold the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur necessarily applicable
to a slip-and-fall injury in a self service grocery store." 326 So. 2d at 489.
22. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 213 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinaf-
ter cited as PROSSER]. An inference is a conclusion based on facts or premises, a
19771
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Company,23 the Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledged that res ipsa
loquitur means only that the circumstances involved in or connected with an
accident are of such character as to justify, in the absence of other evidence
bearing on the subject, the inference that the accident was due to the
negligence of one having control of the thing which caused the injury. The
accident gives rise to the inference of negligence because the totality of
circumstances surrounding the accident are of such character that unless an
explanation can be given, the only reasonable conclusion is that the
accident was due to some omission of the defendant's duty.
A proprietor's expanded duty permits the application of res ipsa
loquitur in slip and fall accidents even under traditional criteria. 24 Slip and
fall accidents normally do not occur in the absence of negligence. The
storekeeper is generally responsible for hazardous conditions created in his
store.25 Further, knowledge of the true cause of the accident is certainly
more accessible to the storekeeper than to the injured shopper. 2 6 Finally, the
instrumentality causing the harm is within the control of the defendant.
"Control," if not to be misleading, must be interpreted flexibly. 27 It should
be enough that the defendant has the right or power of control along with the
derivation by implication. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference-A
Discussion of the Louisiana Cases, 4 LA. L. REV. 70, 71 (1941). See also BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 917 (4th ed. 1968). For example, in an automobile accident caused
by a tire blowout there are many competing inferences. Perhaps the driver was
negligent in not maintaining his tires properly, but perhaps the tire was defective or
the driver ran over an object too small to see, such as a nail. Cox v. Wilson, 267
S.W.2d 83 (Ky. App. 1954). But, when a woman attending a furniture auction is
injured by a live 600-pound steer falling through the ceiling from the room above, the
accident clearly gives rise to an inference of negligence. Guthrie v. Powell, 178 Kan.
587, 290 P.2d 834 (1955).
23. 233 La. 544, 97 So. 2d 389, 391 (1957).
24. (1) The accident is the kind that does not ordinarily occur in the absence of
negligence, (2) the injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
actual or constructive control of the defendant, (3) evidence of the full cause of the
accident is more readily accessible to the defendant. Comment, Problems of Proof:
The Function andApplication of Res Ipsa Loquiturin Louisiana, 25 LA. L. REV. 748,
750 (1965).
25. The storekeeper has the duty to keep the aisles, passageways and floors in a
reasonably safe condition. This duty extends to every hazard which creates an
unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm to his store invitees. See, e.g., Broussard v.
National Food Stores, Inc., 233 So. 2d 599, 601 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970). Thus the
hazardous condition on the floor that causes the slip and fall accident is normally
attributable to a breach of the storekeeper's duty.
26. 326 So. 2d at 488.
27. PROSSER at 221. See Comment, Problems of Proof: The Functions and
Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Louisiana, 25 LA. L. REV. 748, 750 (1965).
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opportunity and responsibility to exercise control.28 The cases recognize
that in a self-service system customers are apt to drop objects on the floor
and that customers are invited to serve themselves and to handle the
merchandise.29 In allowing recovery under the rationale of Kavlich and
Gonzales the court is placing the responsibility for damages caused by the
foreseeable misconduct of other patrons on the storekeeper. 30 Thus the
requirement of control has been met because the court finds that the cause of
the accident is such that the defendant is responsible for the negligence
connected with it.
31
The court has not expressly applied res ipsa loquitur in any of the new
cases either under the traditional criteria or under the Larkin32 standard.
Nevertheless, it seems that the court has applied res ipsa loquitur but refused
to label it as such, which may add to the very confusion sought to be
eliminated. Until the court pretermits the issue by unequivocally stating that
res ipsa loquitur is (or is not) applicable in slip and fall situations, plaintiffs
and defendants will continue to be perplexed as to their legal strategies.
Self-service systems require customers to look at the shelves in order to
locate the goods they wish to purchase. 3 In fact, the merchandise is set out
so as to entice shoppers to focus their attention upon the displays rather than
the floor. 3a Is the patron whose attention has been attracted to the displays
contributorily negligent because he fails to observe an object in his path on
the floor? The cases indicate instead that the storekeeper will not be able to
escape liability by claiming that the shopper should have watched his step,
when in fact it was the storekeeper who created the distraction .35 The patron
has the "right to presume" that the aisles and passageways will be free from
hazardous conditions in light of the storekeeper's intent and knowledge that
28. See note 25, supra.
29. 326 So. 2d at 488.
30. This is not a revolutionary legal concept. See The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1964-1965 Term-Torts, 26 LA. L. REV. 510, 523 (1966).
31. Gonzales refers to Prosser on this point. 326 So. 2d at 488. See PROSSER at
221, 349. See, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964
Term-Torts, 25 LA. L. REV. 334 (1965).
32. See text at note 23, supra.
33. 315 So. 2d at 284.
34. Lofton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 208 So. 2d 739, 743 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
35. Ferrington v. McDaniel, 336 So. 2d 796, 798 (La. 1976); Gonzales v. Winn
Dixie La., Inc., 326 So. 2d 486,489 (La. 1976); see also Guy v. Kroger Co., 204 So. 2d
790 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967); Dever v. George Theriot's, Inc., 159 So. 2d 602 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1964). The court may also be compensating for the absence of comparative
negligence in Louisiana. See Malone, Contributory Negligence and the Landowner
Cases, 29 MINN. L. REV. 61, 68-69 (1945).
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the customer will devote his attention to the displayed merchandise.
36
No doubt, modern self-service supermarkets are better able to bear the
costs of shopping accidents than were the small grocery stores they have
replaced. But the court may have overlooked the benefits that make the
self-service system worthwhile, such as lower prices, faster service and a
greater selection of goods. Ultimately, the class of persons the court
attempted to protect, consumers, may not benefit from the new jurispru-
dence for the cost of the storekeeper's expanded duty will be reflected in
higher priced merchandise.
Bruce James Oreck
36. Wittaker v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, 334 So. 2d 756,757 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1976).
